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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
DOOR-TO-DOOR PERMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR
NONCOMMERCIAL CANVASSERS, DOMESTIC THREAT OR
FREEDOM OF SPEECH?
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150 (2002)*
I. FACTS
The Jehovah's Witnesses spread their religion by offering free religious
literature to anyone interested in reading it.' It is the responsibility of each
Jehovah's Witness' to follow the example of Jesus and follow his command
"to go from house to house" and tell others about the "Kingdom of God."2
Typically, Jehovah's Witnesses will distribute their religious tracts by can-
vassing door-to-door.3 Jehovah's Witnesses do not solicit funds or orders
for merchandise, but they do accept donations. 4
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (Watchtower)
is the body that organizes the preaching activities of Jehovah's Witnesses
across the United States. 5 Watchtower publishes Bibles and Bible-based
publications for Jehovah's Witnesses to distribute free of charge to anyone
interested.6 The Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses,
Inc. conducts the activities of its members in an area of Ohio that includes
the Village of Stratton (Village). 7
The local Jehovah's Witness congregation has experienced problems
with Village officials since 1979.8 Both the police and the mayor have at-
tempted to hinder the Jehovah's Witnesses' door-to-door activity.9 Ac-
* Winner of a North Dakota State Bar Foundation Outstanding Note/Comment Award.
1. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153
(2002).
2. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Strat-
ton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (No. 00-1737).
3. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 160-61.
4. Id. at 153.
5. Id.
6. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Watchtower (No. 00-1737).
7. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 153.
8. Petitioner's Brief at 3, Watchtower (No. 00-1737).
9. Id. Watchtower cited two instances where authorities from the Village intervened with
their door-to-door proselytizing. Id. On one occasion, a member of the Village police instructed a
group of Jehovah's Witnesses to leave saying: "I could care less about your rights." Id. In addi-
tion, the mayor, John Abdalla, confronted four Jehovah's Witnesses who had gone door-to-door
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cording to Village Mayor John Abdalla, there were never any documented
complaints concerning the Jehovah's Witnesses' activity in Stratton.10
However, he did state that no one in the town had any desire to listen to the
Jehovah's Witnesses. I I
Watchtower challenged the constitutionality of Stratton, Ohio, Ordi-
nance No. 1998-5: "Ordinance Regulating Uninvited Peddling and Solicita-
tion Upon Private Property in the Village of Stratton, Ohio."12 The ordi-
nance prohibited Jehovah's Witnesses, and other non-commercial groups,13
from going house-to-house without first obtaining a permit issued by the
mayor. 14
Watchtower first sought an injunction in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio against the Village's enforcement of
the ordinance, which regulated "uninvited peddling" and soliciting on pri-
vate property in the Village.15 Watchtower considered the ordinance a bur-
den imposed on its First Amendment rights. 16 The complaint alleged that
the ordinance violated several constitutional rights including the free exer-
cise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press.17 The ordinance,
specifically section 116.01,18 prohibited "canvassers" from "going in and
upon" private residential property in order to promote any "cause" without
and stated that they were not allowed in the Village and had they been males he would have put
them in jail. Id.
10. Id. at 4.
1l. Id.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 158
(2002); see also STRATrON, OHIO, ORDINANCE NO. 1998-5, § 116.07(b) (1998). This portion of
the ordinance allowed residents to file a "No Solicitation Registration Form" with the mayor's
office that automatically prevented certain groups from canvassing door-to-door at the specific
resident's home. STRATTON, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 1998-5, § 116.07(b). Suggested exemptions
included: Camp Fire Girls, scouting organizations, other churches, political candidates, Christmas
carolers, Little League, and trick or treaters during Halloween season. Id.
14. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Strat-
ton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (No. 00-1737).
15. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 154; Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of
Stratton, 61 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
16. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Watchtower (No. 00-1737).
17. Watchtower, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 736.
18. STRATrON, OHIO, ORDINANCE NO. 1998-5, § 116.01 (1998). This portion of the ordi-
nance stated in part:
The practice of going in and upon private property and/or the private residence of
Village residents in the Village by canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant
merchants or transient vendors of merchandise or services, not having been invited to
do so by the owners or occupants of such private property or residences, and not hav-
ing first obtained a permit pursuant to Section 116.03 of this Chapter, for the purpose
of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization
or cause ... is hereby declared to be a nuisance and is prohibited.
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first obtaining a permit pursuant to section 116.03, which required the ap-
plicant to give their name, address, and other information on the applica-
tion. 19 Though there was no cost to the registrant for the permit,20 and a
permit holder was authorized to enter the premises of homes listed on the
registration form, the registrant had to carry the permit at all times and
show it if requested by a resident or police officer.21 The ordinance allowed
for a potential canvasser to be denied a permit, but no application had been
denied or any permit taken away. 22 The district court held for the Village,
which asserted its interest to protect the residents from what the mayor
called "flim flam" con artists preying on small towns like Stratton.23
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's deci-
sion. 24 The Sixth Circuit found that the ordinance was content neutral and
generally applicable to all canvassers. 25 The Village's interests in protect-
ing residents from fraud and annoyance were sufficient to justify the permit
regulation. 26
19. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 154; STRATrON, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 1998-5, § 116.03
(1998). The ordinance stated in relevant part:
(a) No canvasser... described in Section 116.01 of this Chapter and who intends to
go in or upon private property... in the Village... shall go in or upon private prop-
erty ... without first registering in the office of the Mayor and obtaining a Solicitation
Permit. (b) ... The Form shall be completed by the Registrant and it shall then contain
the following information: (1) The name and home address of the Registrant and Reg-
istrant's residence for five years... ; (2) A brief description of the nature and purpose
of the ... cause ... ; (3) The name and address of the employer or affiliated organiza-
tion, with credentials ... ; (4) The length of time for which the privilege to canvass or
solicit is desired; (5) The specific address of each private residence at which the Reg-
istrant intends to engage in the conduct described in Section 116.01 ....
STRATTON, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 1998-5, § 116.03.
20. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 154.
21. Id. at 156; STRATrON, OHIO, ORDINANCE NO. 1998-5, § 116.04 (1998). This section
required that:
Each person shall at all times, while exercising the privilege in the Village incident to
such permit, carry upon his person his permit and the same shall be exhibited by such
person whenever he is requested to do so by any police officer or by any person who is
solicited.
STRATrON, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 1998-5, § 116.04.
22. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 155-56; see also STRATTON, OHIO, ORDINANCE NO. 1998-5, §
116.06 (1998) (providing that the Village may revoke or deny a permit if the registration form
contains incomplete information or if there is any fraud or misrepresentation on the form).
23. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 61 F. Supp. 2d
734, 736-40 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (holding the ordinance unconstitutional in part where it forbade
canvassers from going door-to-door during the hours between 5:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m.).
24. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 240 F.3d 553, 569 (6th
Cir. 2001).
25. See id. at 561 (explaining that the ordinance was content neutral and of general applica-
bility because the ordinance required all individuals seeking to canvass door-to-door to register
regardless of the content of their message).
26. Id. at 565.
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Watchtower then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.27 The
issue the Court decided was whether a municipal ordinance that required a
noncommercial canvasser to obtain a permit before engaging in door-to-
door advocacy of a cause violated the First Amendment protection given to
anonymous speech.28 The Court held it "offensive-not only to the values
protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free soci-
ety-that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first in-
form the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain
a permit to do sO."29
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
For more than fifty years the Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated
restrictions on door-to-door canvassing on First Amendment grounds.30
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states in pertinent
part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech." 3 1
Jehovah's Witnesses are bound by their religion to proselytize door-to-
door.32 As such, it should not be surprising that Jehovah's Witnesses have
brought many of the Supreme Court's cases dealing with the constitutional-
ity of door-to-door canvassing. 33 Historically, several themes involving the
Jehovah's Witnesses' First Amendment right to proselytize door-to-door
developed: the value of their speech, the importance of door-to-door can-
vassing as a vehicle to proffer their speech, and the rights of other groups to
espouse their views by door-to-door canvassing. 34
A. VALUE OF SPEECH
Distributing tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelism, as old
as the printing press. 35 In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,36 the Court held that a
27. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 153.
28. Id. at 159-60.
29. Id. at 165-66.
30. Id. at 159.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (explaining that Jehovah's Wit-
nesses take Mark 16:15, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature", and
Acts 20:20, to teach "publickly [sic], and from house to house," literally).
33. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 161
(2002).
34. Id.
35. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 108.
36. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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licensing tax on all canvassers was unconstitutional because "preaching
from the pulpits" and going door-to-door were essentially the same, occu-
pying the same "high estate" under the First Amendment. 37 The speech in-
volved in door-to-door canvassing is a form of religious worship, thus, it is
entitled to the same First Amendment protection as other more conventional
exercises of religion. 38 The speech involved when a Jehovah's Witness
knocks on a door to proselytize is a valuable form of speech under the Con-
stitution. 39
B. A VEHICLE
Pamphleteering and door-to-door canvassing have been important ve-
hicles for spreading new ideas and causes. 40 When a Jehovah's Witness
was convicted for canvassing door-to-door without a permit while offering
books and pamphlets, the Court stated that this canvassing was an effective
manner of disseminating her views.41 In Schneider v. State,42 an ordinance
required a canvasser to be subject to the discretion of a government official
for issuance of a permit. 43 The Court recognized that the distribution of
pamphlets by door-to-door canvassing was an effective means of communi-
cation and determined that because the ordinance imposed censorship on
the individual, it violated her First Amendment rights.44 This type of cen-
sorship caused the very struggle in England that led to the establishment of
the doctrine of freedom of the press in the United States Constitution.4 5
The ordinance "str[uck] at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees"
because police chiefs could deny applications for licenses at their discre-
tion.a6 Thus, the Court invalidated the ordinance because police chiefs
could directly censor freedom of speech in violation of the Constitution.4 7
Although the vehicle of disseminating ideas by door-to-door canvass-
ing is a part of the American tradition of free and open discussion, there are
37. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 109.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 108-09; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
41. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 164.
42. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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interests that a town may regulate, such as fraud. 48 In Cantwell v. Con-
necticut,49 the Court recognized that the "cloak of religion" cannot prevent
certain actions by a state to protect its citizens against "fraudulent solicita-
tion." 50 In the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, and convenience, a
state may regulate the time and manner of solicitation in general. 5'
In addition to protecting its citizens from fraud, a state can require re-
strictions on door-to-door canvassing in order to prevent crime.52 In Martin
v. City of Struthers,53 the Court established that the potential for criminals
to "case" their target home by soliciting door-to-door was real.54 To enable
a state to protect its citizens from this criminal threat, the Court recognized
a legitimate interest in preventing crime, which allowed states to place some
restrictions on door-to-door canvassing.55
1. Anonymity Protected
When canvassing door-to-door, it is not necessary to give up one's
anonymity if one does not desire to do so. 56 In Buckley v. American Con-
stitutional Law Foundation, Inc.,57 the Court invalidated an ordinance that
48. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940). In Cantwell, the Court held that the
ordinance that required Jehovah's Witnesses to obtain a license prior to canvassing door-to-door
was invalid, but it recognized that "a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by
requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any pur-
pose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent."
Id. The Court further held that a state could regulate, without unconstitutionally violating the lib-
erties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the time, place, and manner of soliciting on its
streets in order to protect the peace and the "good order and comfort of the community." Id. at
304.
49. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
50. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306. The Court held that giving states the power to establish the
identity of the solicitor and to limit the solicitor's authority to act for any purpose was only a mi-
nor inconvenience to the exercise of religion. Id.
51. Id. at 306-07.
52. Martin v. City of Stmthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943).
53. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
54. Martin, 319 U.S. at 144.
55. Id. Although the Court found the ordinance regulating non-commercial canvassing un-
constitutional, it stated that crime prevention was a valid purpose for the regulation. Id. However,
this was not the purpose of the ordinance in Martin. Id. The purpose was to prevent residents
from being annoyed by Jehovah's Witnesses knocking on their doors. Id. In his concurrence,
Justice Murphy stated that "[n]o doubt there may be relevant considerations which justify consid-
erable regulation of door to door canvassing, even for religious purposes,-regulation as to time,
number and identification of canvassers, etc., which will protect the privacy and safety of the
home and yet preserve the substance of religious freedom." Id. at 151. Justice Black, who deliv-
ered the majority opinion, acknowledged that police and health restrictions, as well as time and
manner restrictions, on door-to-door canvassing would be permitted. Id. at 147.
56. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found. Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999).
57. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
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required circulators of petitions to wear badges with their names on them.58
The Court determined that the requirement to wear identification badges in-
hibited many people from participating in ballot-initiative petition drives.59
The Court acknowledged that the badge requirement would inhibit potential
petition circulators from volunteering due to the potential threat of retalia-
tion on controversial issues. 60 Even though face-to-face interaction re-
vealed the canvassers' physical identity, the Court found that they should be
able to maintain their anonymity.61
2. The Right to Spontaneity
Speech must be allowed to be spontaneous. 62 In Grosjean v. American
Press Co.,63 the Court invalidated an ordinance requiring newspapers with a
certain circulation number to pay a tax.64 Throughout Anglo-American
history, governments have tried to impose taxes on information by taxing
newspapers. 65 This attempt at censoring was not just an attempt to censor
the press, for it was an action by the government to prevent free and general
discussion on matters affecting the public. 66 The Court found this censor-
ship to be unconstitutional, reasoning that citizens must be able to intelli-
gently exercise their rights to free speech.67
C. THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
The Jehovah's Witnesses' struggle against free speech regulations has
furthered the rights of other groups. 68 The ability to spread their causes by
58. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 200.
59. Id. at 198, 200.
60. Id. at 198-99.
61. Id. at 199; see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348-49 (1995).
In McIntyre, the Court held an Ohio law unconstitutional because it required distributors of politi-
cal leaflets to publish the author on the leaflets. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334. The Court reasoned
that "[w]hatever the motivation [for anonymous speech] may be, at least in the field of literary
endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably
outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry." Id. at 342.
62. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936).
63. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
64. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 251.
65. Id. at 246-48. The American Revolution was brought on in part by a 1765 stamp tax on
newspapers, which was characterized as a "tax[] on knowledge." Id. at 246. The taxes were in-
tended to curtail the circulation of newspapers, especially the least expensive ones, whose readers
were the general masses. Id.
66. Id. at 249-50.
67. Id. at 250-51.
68. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 163
(2002); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Independent Baptist Churches of America at 1, Watch-
tower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (No. 00-1737);
2003]
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going door-to-door has been essential for small, under-funded groups. 69 In
Thomas v. Collins,70 the Court determined that a labor leader did not have
to obtain a permit before delivering a speech to potential union members.
7 1
The Court held that the requirement to register by obtaining a permit before
making a public speech was fundamentally at odds with the exercise of free
speech and assembly.72 As long as the assemblies involved no element of
"grave and immediate danger," which a state has an interest in protecting
against, then there would have been no need to require prior registration of
the speaker.73
Unions and their workers have as much of a constitutional right to as-
semble in order to debate to gain support as do businesspeople, farmers,
educators, politicians, and others. 74 The exercise of free speech cannot be
criminalized by requiring people to obtain a permit in order to exercise their
constitutional right to free speech.75 If one solicited support for labor
causes and was required to have a permit as a pre-condition, then so must
any person who wished to solicit support for any social, business, religious,
or political cause.76 The Court held that the requirement to register before
enlisting support for a lawful cause was incompatible with the First
Amendment.77
D. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
The World War II-era cases provided the Court with a sound founda-
tion to determine the constitutionality of the type of speech challenged in
Watchtower.78 These cases established that the value of speech proffered
Karen Kane, Local Church Joins National Case in Favor of Door-to-Door Solicitation,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, June 2, 2002, at N4.
69. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1943) (recognizing that other re-
ligious groups, labor organizations, and politicians have relied on the ability to go door-to-door to
espouse their beliefs without any hindrance from the law).
70. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
71. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 518. Thomas was a leader in two labor unions. Id. at 520. He
served as president of the International Union United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Im-
plements Workers (U.A.W.) and as vice president of the Congress of International Organizations
(C.I.O.). Id. Thomas regarded the permit requirement as a restraint upon free speech and free
assembly because it prevented him from speaking or encouraging people to join the union without
first having a permit. Id. at 522; see also Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 163 (revealing that the Thomas
Court relied on precedent involving Jehovah's Witnesses to help reach its decision).
72. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 539.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 540.
76. Id.
77. Id.




by door-to-door, non-commercial canvassing was very important and wor-
thy of constitutional protection. 79 Although the Court in Martin and Cant-
well recognized that door-to-door canvassing was a valid vehicle to spread
one's cause, it also allowed reasonable limits on the time and manner of
canvassing and recognized the states' right to protect their citizens from
crime and fraud.80 In seeking protection under the wing of the Constitution,
Jehovah's Witnesses have enabled other groups to exercise their First
Amendment rights without obtaining a permit.81
III. ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court reached a split decision in Watch-
tower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton.82 Jus-
tice Stevens delivered the Court's majority opinion. 83 Justice Breyer 84 and
Justice Scalia 85 wrote concurring opinions. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
the lone dissent.86
Despite recognizing the interests a state has in preventing crime and
fraud, as well as protecting the privacy of residents, precedent mandated the
Court to strike a balance between these interests and the effect regulation
would have on First Amendment rights. 87 To determine this balance, how-
ever, the Court refused to state which standard of review was appropriate
for assessing the constitutionality of the ordinance.88 Instead, the Court re-
solved the dispute by determining that the breadth and nature of the speech
that was affected clearly outweighed the Village's interests in preventing
fraud, crime, and annoyances to its residents. 89
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, which Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.90 The Court recognized that
the ordinance applied to a wide variety of noncommercial and commercial
79. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943).
80. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 306 (1940).
81. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539 (1945).
82. 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
83. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 153.
84. Id. at 169 (Breyer, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 171 (Scalia, J., concurring).
86. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 164-65.
88. Id. at 164. Justice Breyer insisted that intermediate scrutiny was in fact used. Id. at 170.
89. Id. at 164.
90. Id. at 152.
20031
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canvassers. 91 It found that the ordinance was overbroad, not only applying
to religious causes but also to political ones. 92 The Court determined that
the ordinance did not differentiate between commercial and noncommercial
solicitations. 93 If the ordinance differentiated between commercial and
noncommercial solicitations, it would have been better tailored to further
the Village's stated interests of preventing fraud and protecting privacy. 94
In fact, Justice Stevens noted that the ordinance included many noncom-
mercial "canvassers" promoting various "causes."
95
1. Liberty Restricted
Although the permits were distributed in a nondiscriminatory manner
to all who desired them, the Court found the permit requirement offensive
to the values protected by the First Amendment. 96 Justice Stevens reasoned
that to require a citizen to first fill out a form informing the government of a
desire to speak to a neighbor, then requiring a permit to do so, was a sig-
nificant departure from tradition and heritage. 97
The Court found the ordinance's requirement mandating canvassers to
surrender their anonymity by being identified on an application for a permit
available for public viewing unconstitutional. 98 It found many reasons why
the decision to favor anonymity was prudent-the fear of economic or offi-
cial retaliation, social ostracism, or simply the desire to preserve one's pri-
vacy.99 Whatever the reason, the Court found that the interest of having
91. Id. at 165.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 162, 165 (recognizing that ordinances differentiate between commercial and
noncommercial solicitations, particularly when solicitation of money is involved); see also Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (condoning limitations on commercial solicitors
because of the potential for fraud).
95. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165
(2002). Some of the non-commercial groups included in the portion of the ordinance that allowed
residents to file "No Solicitation Forms" with the Village to preclude the particular group from
going to that resident's home were: Camp Fire Girls, Jehovah's Witnesses, political candidates,
trick or treaters during Halloween season, and persons ffiliated with Stratton Church. Id.
96. Id. at 165-66.
97. See id. (realizing that it would be a mere ministerial task to fill out the form, but the act
of doing so would be antithetical to the notions embedded in the First Amendment guarantee of
free speech).
98. Id. at 166.
99. See id. (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995)
(outlining the opposition to an Ohio statute requiring handbills to be labeled with the author's
name and recognizing the strong historical policy of allowing an author to remain anonymous)).
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anonymous thoughts entering the marketplace of ideas far outweighed any
interest requiring disclosure. '00
The Court reasoned that while it would be true that anyone choosing to
canvass door-to-door in a neighborhood would give up one's anonymity to
the cause they were espousing, the interests of anonymity would still be
present.' 0 ' The Court referred to Buckley where a requirement that forced
circulators of petitions to wear badges with their names was invalidated. 102
It noted that the Court in Buckley determined that the requirement to wear
identification badges inhibited many people from participating in ballot-
initiative petition drives.103 This was because the regulation in Buckley
made potential petition circulators on controversial issues afraid of retalia-
tion, thus less likely to volunteer.104 Analogizing Watchtower to Buckley,
the Court stated that strangers to the Village would certainly maintain their
anonymity without the ordinance, but the ordinance could deter them from
canvassing for unpopular causes if they knew their anonymity would not be
protected. 05 The Village ordinance covered unpopular causes that were
clearly unrelated to commercial activities or to the integrity of the election
process. 10 6
The Court also reasoned that requiring citizens holding religious or pa-
triotic views to first obtain a permit in order to exercise their right to speak
would impose a significant burden.107 It found that the religious beliefs of
potentially significant numbers of persons would preclude them from ob-
taining a permit in order to canvass door-to-door.108 In addition to religious
objectors, there could be what the Court called "patriotic citizens" who be-
100. Id. at 166-67 (quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342). In McIntyre, the Court stated that
"[alnonymity thereby provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that
readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do not like its proponent." McIntyre,
514 U.S. at 342.
101. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Sratton, 536 U.S. 150,
166-67 (2002) (explaining that the Jehovah's Witnesses did not object to their loss of anonymity,
but they brought the claim on the basis of overbreadth). But see Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y
of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 240 F.3d 553, 563 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that Jehovah's Wit-
nesses who canvassed in the Village would "reveal a portion of their identities" just by virtue of
going door-to-door).
102. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 167
(2002) (citing Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 184 (1999)).
103. Id. (citing Buckley, 525 U.S. at 184).
104. Id. (citing Buckley, 525 U.S. at 198-99).
105. Id. (citing Buckley, 525 U.S. at 198-99).
106. See id. (recognizing that anonymity is not as important as protecting residents from
fraudulent commercial transactions).
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 448 (1938) (stating that Jehovah's
Witnesses consider the requirement of getting a permit to canvass door-to-door "an act of disobe-
dience to His commandment").
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lieved their uninhibited right of free debate in the context of door-to-door
advocacy to be sacred, and they would prefer silence over speech licensed
by the government. 09
Justice Stevens recognized that spontaneous speech would be banned
by the ordinance." 10 He reasoned that if any citizens of Stratton decided on
a weekend or a holiday to take an active role in a political campaign, they
would be forbidden from going door-to-door until they obtained the re-
quired permit."'I Justice Stevens noted a similarity between Watchtower
and Grosjean, where an ordinance that required newspapers with a certain
circulation number to pay a tax was invalidated."12 Quoting Grosjean, he
reasoned that "any action of the government by means of which it might
prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems abso-
lutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their
rights as citizens" was to be avoided.113 Justice Stevens recognized that the
government cannot regulate spontaneous speech by enacting laws to regu-
late the manner of expression.'14
2. Narrowly Tailored
In addition to finding that the ordinance did not pass First Amendment
scrutiny because of the ordinance's "breadth and unprecedented nature," the
Court found that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to the Village's
stated interests. 1 5 Though the majority found that the interest in preventing
fraud could justify regulating commercial transactions and the solicitation
of funds, that interest could not justify regulating door-to-door solicitations
of Jehovah's Witnesses, political campaigns, or groups encouraging support
for unpopular causes.1 16 The Court noted Judge Gilman's dissent in the
Sixth Circuit's decision in which he found that the ordinance restricted a
"substantial quantity of speech unrelated to the Village's interest in elimi-
nating fraud.""17 The Court agreed with Judge Gilman who expressed that
109. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Viii. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 167
(2002).
110. Id.
111. See id. (recognizing that a spontaneous decision by a citizen to urge a neighbor to a
certain cause would be restricted without first getting a permit from the mayor).
112. Id. at 168 (citing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936)).
113. Id. (quoting Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 249-50 (quoting 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL




117. Id. at 160 (citing Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 240
F.3d 553, 572 (6th Cir. 2001) (Gilman, J., dissenting)).
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the Village failed to show the effectiveness of the restriction or the reality
of harm to the Village.11 8 The overbreadth of the ordinance outweighed the
potential for fraud. 119
The Court noted that in addition to preventing fraud, the Village argued
that the interest of protecting its citizens' privacy validated the ordinance.
20
The Court acknowledged that there has always been the unquestioned right
of individuals to refuse to converse with a visitor.121 It concluded that this
right to refuse provided adequate protection to the privacy of the unwilling
listener. 122 Additionally, the Court recognized that the posting of "No So-
licitation" signs by residents was not challenged.123 The Court further
noted that annoyance caused by an unwelcome knock would be the same
regardless of whether the visitor had a permit.124
The Court found that requiring permits for canvassers would not reduce
the criminal threat to residents; thus, the ordinance was not narrowly tai-
lored to this interest either.125 It reasoned that if a criminal wanted to by-
pass the permit requirement, the criminal could pose as a surveyor or an-
other person not covered by the ordinance.126 A criminal could also register
with the mayor's office under a false name because the ordinance did not
require a background check on the identity of the applicant.127 The Village
did not assert crime prevention as an interest in previous cases, and there
was no evidence offered regarding a special crime problem related to door-
to-door solicitation in the Village. 28 While the Supreme Court refused to
state which standard of review was appropriate for assessing the constitu-
tionality of the ordinance, it determined that the breadth and nature of the
speech that was affected outweighed the Village's interests in preventing
fraud, crime, and annoyances to its residents.
29
118. Id. (quoting Watchtower, 240 F.3d at 572 (Gilman, J., dissenting)).
119. Id. at 164.
120. Id. at 168.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Court recognized that Jehovah's Witnesses heed "No Solicitation" signs. Id. at
156.
123. Id. at 168.
124. Id. at 168-69.
125. Id. at 169.
126. Id. The ordinance would not require a permit for a surveyor because such an individual
would not be entering private property "for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or
explaining any product, service, organization or cause..." Id. at 156 n. 1 (quoting STRATrON,
OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 1998-5, § 116.01 (1998)).
127. Id. at 169.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 164.
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B. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Breyer joined the majority, but he wrote separately to note that
the "crime prevention" argument of the dissent was weak.130 Primarily,
Justice Breyer did not believe that the Village relied on what the courts be-
low based their decision on, crime deterrence. 131 He argued that the general
references to "deterring crime" in the Village's brief to the Court included
nothing that could be construed as more than preventing fraud as the Vil-
lage specifically discussed. 132
Justice Breyer reasoned that in the intermediate scrutiny context, the
Court does not supply reasons why an interest fits when the legislative body
has not provided them.1 33 He concluded that if the Village thought pre-
venting burglaries and violent crimes was an important justification for the
regulation, it would have specifically claimed this justification in its
brief. 134
Justice Breyer argued that the ordinance did not serve any governmen-
tal interest in preventing crime. 135 He reasoned that several groups of
criminals would not be affected by the Village's ordinance. 36 In addition,
Justice Breyer stated that it was not enough for the Court to accept by mere
conjecture the possibility that the ordinance would prevent potential crimi-
nals from preying on the residents of Stratton. 137 The possibility of pre-
venting crime, mere conjecture according to Justice Breyer, did not out-
weigh the cost of abridging the speech covered by the ordinance. 138
130. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
131. See id. at 170 (defining crime as burglaries and violent crime, not con artists seeking to
defraud residents); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 240
F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that the Village had the right to protect its residents from
"fraud and undue annoyance"); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton,
61 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (describing the ordinance as "constructed to protect the
Village residents from 'rim flam' con artists").
132. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 170
(2002); see also Brief for Respondents at 14-18, Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v.
Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (No. 00-1737) (arguing the Village's claimed interest of
preventing crime).
133. See Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 170 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000) (explaining that when the government restricts speech, it has the burden
of proving the constitutionality of its actions)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. The majority opinion pointed out that the ordinance did not require permits for sur-
veyors who could potentially be impersonated by criminals to gain access to the homes of resi-
dents. Id. at 156 n.1.
137. Id. at 170 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000)).
138. Id. at 171.
[VOL. 79:369
CASE COMMENT
C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
While Justice Scalia agreed in the judgment, he did not agree that one
of the reasons for the invalidity of the ordinance was that some people
would have an objection to applying for a permit because of their relig-
ion. 139 He was concerned with the concept of an otherwise lawful licensing
requirement being invalidated because some people, for religious reasons,
might choose to forego their speech rather than adhering to the require-
ment. 140
Justice Scalia ended his opinion by referencing the majority opinion's
"fairy-tale" category of "patriotic citizens," those who would rather be si-
lenced than licensed.141 He did not agree with this characterization and
stated, "If our free-speech jurisprudence is to be determined by the pre-
dicted behavior of such crackpots, we are in a sorry state indeed."14
2
D. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S DISSENT
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the majority's deci-
sion contravened prior established case law, created a new doctrine that
would leave communities helpless to address the safety threat that canvass-
ers bring, and ultimately would result in less door-to-door communica-
tion.14 3 He proffered the example of the relatively small college town of
Hanover, New Hampshire, home of Dartmouth College, where two profes-
sors were killed by canvassers.144 In the Chief Justice's example, two teen-
agers went door-to-door intending to steal credit card numbers and then kill
139. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia quoted the majority opinion in saying that
others do not "have such firm convictions about their constitutional right to engage in uninhibited
debate in the context of door-to-door advocacy, that they would prefer silence to speech licensed
by a petty official." Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also Shawn Francis Peters, Court Ruling Again Places Jehovah's Witnesses as
Patriotic Citizens, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 21, 2002, at 3J (stating that Scalia's comment
concerning "patriotic citizens" was "crudely" meant to be an affront on Jehovah's Witnesses);
Jason L. Riley, Houses of Worship: Door-to-Door, Disturbingly, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2002, at
W15 (believing Scalia's comments concerning the "patriotic citizens" and "crackpots" referred to
Jehovah's Witnesses in general). But see Letters to the Editor: For the Witnesses, Love Says It
All, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2002, at A13 (stating that Justice Scalia was not specifically referring to
Jehovah's Witnesses). A letter to the editor by Philip Brumley and Paul Polidoro, general counsel
for Watchtower, stated that Scalia did not refer to Jehovah's Witnesses specifically as the "patri-
otic citizens" and "crackpots." Id. Brumley and Polidoro instead believed that Scalia was refer-
ring to the majority's hypothetical "other patriotic citizens" and not specifically Jehovah's Wit-
nesses. Id.
143. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 172
(2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
144. Id. (citing Pamela Ferdinand, Dartmouth Professors Called Random Targets, WASH.
POST, Feb. 20, 2002, at A2).
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the owners. 145 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the reason the Village
enacted the ordinance was to prevent such grave risks associated with can-
vassing.146 He reasoned that because the residents did not prohibit canvass-
ers from going door-to-door, the Village's interests in preventing crime and
protecting the privacy of residents were constitutional. 147
Chief Justice Rehnquist determined permit requirements on door-to-
door canvassing were constitutional, as evidenced in case law. 48 He ar-
gued that for over sixty years, permit requirements for door-to-door can-
vassers, which did not give discretion to the issuing authority, had been
constitutional.149 Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that in Cantwell, the
Court held that it would not allow persons, "under the cloak of religion,"150
to commit frauds upon the public with impunity.151 He agreed with the
Court in Cantwell that religion could be inconvenienced so that the state
could prevent injury to its citizens. 152
Chief Justice Rehnquist was also troubled by the majority's lack of dis-
cernment regarding what test it applied to find that the ordinance violated
the First Amendment. 53 He thought a straightforward application of inter-
mediate scrutiny would have allowed the ordinance to easily pass constitu-
tional muster. 54 He reasoned that because the ordinance would have al-
lowed anyone to canvass in the Village, it was content neutral; the
ordinance only required someone to get a permit before canvassing door-to-
door. 155 He cited to Ward v. Rock Against Racism,156 where even in a pub-
lic forum, it was within the government's power to "impose reasonable re-
strictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech" so long as the
restrictions were content-neutral in nature and narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and there also had to be room for ade-
145. Id. at 172-73.
146. Id. at 173.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 173-74 (citing Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1976); Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940)).
149. See id. (pointing out that Justices Douglas and Black, who had the Supreme Court's
most expansive view of the First Amendment, believed permit requirements were constitutional).
150. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306.
151. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Viii. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
174 (2002) (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306).
152. See id. (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306).
153. Id. at 175.
154. See id. (recognizing that there was no support in case law for applying anything more
stringent than intermediate scrutiny).
155. Id.
156. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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quate alternative ways to communicate information effectively.157 The
Village ordinance did not bar citizens from going door-to-door because ob-
taining a permit was all that was required before they were allowed to can-
vass. 15 8
Chief Justice Rehnquist continued by arguing that states may prevent
fraudulent solicitation by requiring strangers to identify themselves before
allowing them to solicit in the community.159 The ordinance did not forbid
door-to-door canvassing, for it merely required the canvasser to obtain a
permit, which was granted without discretion by the mayor prior to can-
vassing.160
Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that the Village's significant interest
of preventing crime should have rendered the ordinance constitutional.161
He relied on the Court's assertion in Martin that door-to-door canvassing
posed a risk of crime. 162 He reasoned that this assertion should have en-
abled the Village to rely on the Court's rationale in Martin. 63 While the
majority conceded that preventing crime was an important interest, it stated
that the absence of crime related to door-to-door canvassing lessened the
interest. 164 Chief Justice Rehnquist thought that the Village should be able
to rely on previous decisions and experiences of other jurisdictions regard-
ing crime arising from door-to-door activity.165 The double murder in
Hanover was one example he offered to show that the Village should have
been able to rely on the experiences of other jurisdictions in order to justify
the ordinance. 166
157. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Viii. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 175
(2002) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984))).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 174 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940)).
160. Id. at 167, 175.
161. See id. at 177-78 (recognizing that the majority conceded that preventing crime was a
valid interest, but it found that no special crime problem related to door-to-door solicitation was
on the record and therefore the interest was lessened).
162. Id. (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943)).
163. Id. (quoting Martin, 319 U.S. at 144).
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296-97 (2000). In Erie, the
Court stated that a "city need not 'conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities"' to show the problem of crime "so long as whatever evidence
the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses."
Erie, 529 U.S. at 296-97 (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52
(1986)).
166. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 177 (2002).
The other examples Chief Justice Rehnquist gave were: a man who solicited gardening jobs door-
to-door and tied up and robbed elderly residents, a door-to-door vacuum cleaner salesman who
raped a woman, and a man going door-to-door purportedly on the behalf of a church who com-
mitted sexual assaults. Id.
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The majority found the interests of the Village too broad because they
affected too many noncommercial canvassers, but Chief Justice Rehnquist
believed that this finding was countered by the fact that noncommercial
canvassers could violate "No Trespassing" signs and engage in criminal ac-
tivity just as easily as commercial canvassers. 167 He argued that the ordi-
nance was narrowly tailored to the important government interests of pre-
venting crime and protecting the privacy of residents because it applied to
everyone who canvassed door-to-door.
68
Chief Justice Rehnquist then addressed whether the ordinance served
the important interests of protecting privacy and preventing fraud and
crime.169 He argued that by requiring a permit, a resident would receive
fewer uninvited knocks.170 He further argued that deterring criminals from
taking advantage of door-to-door canvassing would not necessarily depend
on them registering; the ordinance prevented and detected crime by making
it a crime not to register.'71 A law need not solve the crime problem to
surmount intermediate scrutiny, for it need only further the interest in pre-
venting the crime. 172
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that a homeowner has a right to be left
alone.173 He did not understand why regulations concerning speech occur-
ring on private property should be subjected to a higher level of scrutiny
than regulations concerning speech taking place in public. 174 He argued
that the Court's precedent was contrary to this distinction. 175
In addition to having an interest in preventing crime and protecting pri-
vacy, Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that the ordinance provided am-
167. See id. at 178-79 (quoting Martin, 319 U.S. at 144 (stating that regardless of whether a
canvasser was distributing leaflets or selling pots, that person could "spy out" the home for poten-
tial burglary, lessening the peaceful enjoyment of the home)).
168. Id. at 178.
169. Id. at 178-79.
170. Id. at 179.
171. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist elaborated that the murderers at Dartmouth College made
five visits before finding their victims. Id. He argued that if there had been a permit requirement,
they may have been stopped by the police or an alert neighbor before reaching their objective. Id.
172. Id. at 179-80.
173. Id. at 178.
174. Id. at 176.
175. Id. at 175. Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted the prominent Harvard Law School Profes-
sor Zechariah Chafee:
Of all the methods of spreading unpopular ideas, [house-to-house canvassing] seems
the least entitled to extensive protection. The possibilities of persuasion are slight
compared with the certainties of annoyance. Great as is the value of exposing citizens
to novel views, home is one place where a man ought to be able to shut himself up in
his own ideas if he desires.
Id. at 176 (quoting Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (quoting ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 406 (1954) (alteration in the original)).
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pie alternatives to express one's views. 176 He reasoned that canvassers
were free to go door-to-door if they filled out a permit application.177 Ad-
ditionally, even if one did not have a permit, that person could still commu-
nicate in public places.178
Chief Justice Rehnquist feared that striking down the ordinance would
provide for less door-to-door communication. 179 He argued that homeown-
ers could place a "No Solicitation" sign on their property and it would be a
crime to ignore the sign's warning.180 If the government did not have the
right to regulate non-commercial door-to-door canvassers, many residents
would decide to place "No Solicitation" signs on their property, thereby
cutting off door-to-door communication completely. 181
IV. IMPACT
Since the Court's decision in Watchtower, courts have sought to distin-
guish the holding by differentiating between commercial and noncommer-
cial canvassing laws.' 82 In Anderson v. Treadwell,183 the Second Circuit
rejected an argument by real estate brokers to strike down an ordinance that
forbid them from canvassing in certain neighborhoods that were "at risk"
for "blockbusting."184 The court rejected the Supreme Court's approach in
Watchtower, reasoning that it applied only to noncommercial speech.1
85
The important interest of prohibiting "blockbusting" barred the real estate
brokers from succeeding in their constitutional challenge. 186
While courts have not been quick to expand the Supreme Court's
opinion in Watchtower to commercial canvassing laws,187 the decision
prompted some municipalities to look hard at their current ordinances, and






182. See, e.g., Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 462 (2d Cir. 2002).
183. 294 F.3d 453 (2d Cir. 2002).
184. Anderson, 294 F.3d at 456-57. Blockbusting is the practice of soliciting real estate sales
by making representations that the neighborhood is changing in racial, ethnic, or religious charac-
ter. Id. at 457. Section 296(3-b) of New York Human Rights Law outlaws this practice. Id.; N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 296(3-b) (McKinney 2001). Section 442-h of New York Real Property Law allows
the Secretary of State to prohibit all solicitations of residential real estate listings and sales in a
defined geographic area that have been found to be subject to blockbusting practices. Anderson,
294 F.3d at 457; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 442-h(3) (McKinney 2001).
185. Anderson, 294 F.3d at 461.
186. See id. (realizing that the privacy of residents is an important interest that a government
can safeguard through regulation of solicitation).
187. See, e.g., id.; Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 461-65 (2d Cir. 2002).
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in some cases, ban the requirement of permits for commercial door-to-door
canvassing.188 In two suburban Chicago communities, Inverness and Lake
Barrington, local boards voted to abandon registration and background
checks for anyone wanting to conduct door-to-door business.189 Though
neither ordinance regulated religious or political canvassers, the attorney for
both communities recommended the change. 90 In Sunrise, Florida, the city
attorney recommended that the city drop the requirement that people solic-
iting for charities pay for a city permit before going door-to-door. 191
While some municipalities changed their ordinances to allow commer-
cial canvassing without a permit, others believed that their ordinances com-
plied with the Court's decision in Watchtower because the ordinances did
not regulate noncommercial canvassers and the Court's decision in Watch-
tower did not apply to commercial canvassing regulations.192  West
Lafayette, Indiana, concluded that its ordinance requiring door-to-door
commercial canvassers to obtain a license from the police department was
not affected by the Court's decision in Watchtower.193 Mount Vernon, New
York, recently reviewed its ordinance that required commercial vendors to
pay a fee, concluding that the ordinance was distinct because it allowed for
noncommercial door-to-door canvassing.194 Undoubtedly, many other mu-
nicipalities have ordinances with similar restrictions on commercial can-
vassers that do not restrict noncommercial canvassing.195
Still other communities have been forced to change their ordinances
because they required permits for religious and political noncommercial
canvassers. 196 The city council of Mount Vernon, New York, while decid-
188. Aamer Madhani, Suburbs Relax Laws on Home Canvassing, CHI. TRiB., Aug. 9, 2002,
at 1; Jeremy Milarsky, Solicitors Can Skip Permits, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 2002, at 1.
189. Madhani, supra note 188, at 1.
190. Id. The attorney stated, "I don't think the ruling leaves any practical room for a system
of permits. . . . The feeling is, if you are going to have people register, it should be across the
board. It can be problematic to have restrictions on some people and not on others." Id.
191. Milarsky, supra note 188, at 1 (stating that the residents who do not wish to be bothered
by salespeople can put up "No Soliciting" signs and trespassers will be arrested).
192. Stacy Brown, Door-to-Door Speech Protected, J. NEWS, June 18, 2002, at 1A; Marc B.
Geller, Door-to-Door Ruling Pleases Leaders, J. & COURIER, July 5, 2002, at 1A; Tony Mauro,
Church of Free Speech, AM. LAW., Feb. 2002, at 67. Paul Polidoro, associate general counsel for
Watchtower, stated that most municipalities have allowed Jehovah's Witnesses to go door-to-door
and that only "pockets around the country" have regulated permit requirements. Mauro, supra, at
67.
193. Geller, supra note 192, at IA.
194. Brown, supra note 192, at IA.
195. All Things Considered (National Public Radio (NPR) radio broadcast, June 17, 2002).
There are many local governments requiring permits specifically for commercial solicitation; there
are fewer permit regulations that address political, religious, and charitable canvassers. Id.
196. Stacy Brown, Mount Vernon, J. NEWS, July 1, 2002, at 3B; Harriet Chiang & Ryan
Kim, Door-to-Door Soliciting Ruled Constitutional Right, S.F. CHRON., June 18, 2002, at Al.
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ing to keep regulations on commercial canvassers, was forced by the
Court's decision in Watchtower to stop requiring religious canvassers to
buy permits before going door-to-door.197 Though it rarely enforced its or-
dinance banning religious or charitable organizations from going door-to-
door, Pleasanton, California, was prepared to rework its ordinance to render
it consistent with the Court's decision in Watchtower.198
Jehovah's Witnesses were not the only group that benefited from the
decision in Watchtower.199 In 1983, outside of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
the youth pastor of Calvary Baptist Church (CBC) was stopped by police
for going door-to-door on a "crusade." 200 Ten years later, a similar con-
frontation occurred between a church staff member and authorities. 20' Be-
cause of this constriction of its First Amendment rights, CBC, along with
forty-five other independent Baptist churches, joined the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses lawsuit against the Village by filing an amicus curiae brief.202 CBC
was concerned that the Village ordinance would spread, preventing it from
"preach[ing] the gospel."203
197. Brown, supra note 196, at 3B. Praising the decision by the city council, local Jehovah's
Witnesses welcomed the change. Id. The ordinance that was repealed stated: "Anyone canvass-
ing or soliciting on behalf of a religious organization without a permit shall be guilty of a violation
punishable by a fine not to exceed $150 or a jail term not to exceed 90 days or both." Id. (citing
MOUNT VERNON, N.Y., CITY CODE § 194-38 repealed).
198. Chiang & Kim, supra note 196, at A].
199. Geller, supra note 192, at IA; Karen Kane, Communities Likely to Review Law After
Ruling, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 23, 2002, at N3.
200. Kane, supra note 68, at N4.
201. Id.
202. Id. CBC joining in the lawsuit with the Jehovah's Witnesses was difficult and some-
what surprising because it considered the Jehovah's Witnesses an "apostate religion" that "will-
fully departed from the clear teaching of the Scripture." Id.; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae In-
dependent Baptist Churches of America at 1, Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v.
Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (No. 00-1737). The amicus brief stated:
The Independent Baptist Churches of America [(CBC and forty-five other Baptist
churches)] believe that anonymous solicitation and canvassing of communities to so-
licit membership in churches and Sunday schools is both constitutionally protected
and biblically prescribed. Specifically, the Independent Baptist Churches of America
rely upon the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
upon the biblical imperatives stemming from Jesus Christ's command in Matthew
28:19, 20, and the biblical prescription for door-to-door, two-by-two canvassing as set
forth in Luke 10:1:4.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Independent Baptist Churches of America at 1, Watchtower (No. 00-
1737).
203. Kane, supra note 68, at N3 (quoting CBC's pastor who stated that though his church
had not been challenged very much while engaging in door-to-door proselytizing, his church now
had the authority of the Supreme Court to evangelize); see also Geller, supra note 192, at IA.
Geller's article highlighted a Maranantha Baptist Church pastor who supported the Watchtower
decision saying, "This is America. We are supposed to have the freedom of speech." Geller, su-
pra, at IA. The pastor cited the importance of church members having the freedom to go door-to-
door without first obtaining a permit to proselytize. Id. Politicians have also endorsed the deci-
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V. CONCLUSION
Though it recognized a governmental interest to protect citizens from
the potential of crime, fraud, and annoyance from door-to-door canvassers,
the Supreme Court deemed these interests to be substantially outweighed by
the "significant number of noncommercial 'canvassers' promoting a wide
variety of 'causes."' 204 The ordinance permit requirement, while but a
"ministerial task," interfered with a person's right to free speech and "con-
stitute[d] a dramatic departure from our national heritage and constitutional
tradition." 205 Because the ordinance restrictions outweighed the high cost
of limiting the speech covered, the Court held the ordinance unconstitu-
tional. 206
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sion to strike down the Village ordinance saying it upholds the Constitution's guarantee of free-
dom of speech. Id.
204. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165
(2002).
205. Id. at 166.
206. Id. at 169.
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